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Team Production Revisited 
William W. Bratton* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article reconsiders Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team 
production model of corporate law, offering a favorable evaluation. The 
model explains both the legal corporate entity and corporate governance 
institutions in microeconomic terms as the means to the end of 
encouraging investment, situating corporations within markets and 
subject to market constraints but simultaneously insisting that 
productive success requires that corporations remain independent of 
markets. The model also integrates the inherited framework of corporate 
law into an economically derived model of production, constructing a 
microeconomic description of large enterprises firmly rooted in corporate 
doctrine but neither focused on nor limited by a description of principal-
agent relationships among shareholders and managers. This Article 
shows that the model retains descriptive robustness, despite the 
substantial accretion of shareholder power during the two decades since 
its appearance. The Article also shows that the model taught three 
groundbreaking lessons to corporate legal theory. First, nothing binds 
microeconomic analysis together with a theory of the firm rooted in 
shareholder primacy. Second, microeconomics, with its emphases on 
efficiency and maximization, can be deployed in the service of an 
allocatively sensitive description of corporate governance, providing a 
more capacious methodological tent than anyone in corporate law 
understood prior to Blair and Stout’s intervention. Third, it is not only 
possible but arguably necessary to take corporate law seriously when 
articulating a microeconomic theory of corporate production. To the 
extent an economic model’s description of the appropriate legal 
framework differs materially from the inherited legal framework, there 
is a possible, even a probable, infirmity in the model.  
 
 
 * Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law 
School; de la Cruz/Mentschikoff Endowed Chair in Law and Economics and Senior Lecturer, 
University of Miami School of Law; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance 
Institute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout published A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law in the Virginia Law Review in 1999.1 It is an 
article that does not announce its own importance. Nor does it identify 
a gap in the literature that it claims to fill. It stakes no explicit claim to 
an innovative, brilliant contribution. It does not have to. A Team 
Production Theory is the rare law review article that really does fill a 
gap. In fact, at the time of its appearance, it filled several gaps and in 
so doing made a brilliant and innovative theoretical contribution, 
pushing the envelope of corporate legal theory in new and salubrious 
directions. Were I asked to name the leading theoretical contributions 
to corporate law literature in the last century, I would include it on a 
shelf containing five books—Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The 
 
 1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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Modern Corporation and Private Property,2 Melvin Eisenberg’s The 
Structure of the Corporation,3 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel’s 
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,4 Mark Roe’s Strong 
Managers, Weak Owners,5 and Henry Hansmann’s The Ownership of 
Enterprise.6 
Blair and Stout set forth a team production model (“TPM”) of 
corporate organization. The TPM explains both the legal corporate 
entity and corporate governance institutions in microeconomic terms as 
the means to the end of encouraging investment. In so doing it situates 
corporations within markets and subject to market constraints. The 
model simultaneously insists that corporations remain independent of 
markets and that the element of independence contributes materially 
to their success as producers. The TPM also integrates the inherited 
framework of corporate law into an economically derived model of 
production. It offers a microeconomic description of the firm that is 
firmly rooted in corporate doctrine but is neither focused on nor limited 
by a description of principal-agent relationships among shareholders, 
board members, and managers. The TPM retains descriptive 
robustness, despite the substantial accretion of shareholder power 
during the two decades since its appearance.  
In thus leaving agency behind as it fused microeconomics and 
legal doctrine into a theory of the firm, the TPM taught three 
groundbreaking lessons, two about methodology and one about 
substance. First, nothing binds microeconomic analysis together with a 
theory of the firm that is rooted in shareholder primacy, shareholder 
primacy being the normative view that the purpose of the corporation 
is to maximize value of the shareholders. Second, microeconomics, with 
its emphases on efficiency and maximization, can be deployed to serve 
an allocatively sensitive description of corporate governance, providing 
a more capacious methodological tent than anyone on corporate law 
theretofore had understood. Third, it is not only possible but arguably 
necessary to take corporate law seriously when articulating a 
microeconomic theory of corporate production. To the extent an 
economic model’s description of the appropriate legal framework differs 
 
 2. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 3. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).  
 4. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 5. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 6. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). 
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materially from the inherited legal framework, there is a possible, even 
a probable, infirmity in the model.  
Despite all of this, the TPM did not achieve paradigmatic 
dominance, or even general acceptance as a useful alternative 
perspective. This is because corporate legal theory is not at bottom 
about descriptive accuracy or methodological correctness. It is above all 
responsive to normative concerns. The academic community’s equivocal 
reception of the TPM demonstrates the depth of its commitment to the 
norm that corporate managers be held accountable for their exercises 
of the power to direct the business and its continued view that corporate 
law fails to adequately assure accountability. The TPM stands for a 
contrasting, contractarian proposition—that market and legal 
constraints adequately (if not perfectly) control managers and that the 
salient normative concern is the encouragement of firm-specific 
investment. The choice between the two perspectives is a judgment call, 
an exercise likely to be influenced heavily by ideological preferences. It 
thus is not Blair and Stout’s fault that the wider community did not 
accept their model’s normative invitation, however well made. 
Meanwhile, no one knows what the future may bring. As more and more 
power accretes to shareholders, a converse accountability problem 
becomes more and more salient. An adjustment of academic views 
remains a distinct possibility. 
This Article expands on this evaluation of the TPM.  
Part I is preparatory, describing the theoretical landscape onto 
which Blair and Stout intervened. The presentation covers a 
considerable stretch of historical territory, sketching the evolution of 
corporate legal theory from the post-war period through the end of the 
twentieth century. It is for the most part a story of shareholder primacy 
and agency relationships in theory and shareholder travails and 
excessive agency costs in practice, but not entirely. There is also 
recessive managerialist strain, a strain reinvigorated by the TPM. 
Part II recounts in detail the TPM as described in Blair and 
Stout’s 1999 article. The discussion begins with the model’s economic 
assertions, then traces its antecedents in economic literature, and turns 
finally to the relation of mutual support between the economic TPM and 
the structural inheritance of corporate law. 
Part III reconsiders the TPM as economics, as contractarianism, 
as legal doctrine, and as history.  
I. CONTEXT  
This Article claims that Blair and Stout made a great 
contribution by filling gaps in the dispensation of corporate law and 
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economics. To sustain the claim, that preexisting dispensation needs to 
be described. This Part fills in this historical background. 
The account starts by turning the clock back to the era before 
the arrival of law and economics, picking up with the period from 1945 
to the early 1970s. This is the time when corporate management 
enjoyed a great deal of prestige and microeconomic theory had little to 
say about the internal operation of corporations. The timeline moves 
forward to the economic strains of the 1970s, when perspectives and 
evaluations changed markedly. There was an anti-managerial backlash 
accompanied by the beginning of corporate governance as we now know 
it and the appearance of agency theory in microeconomics. Agency 
theory introduces shareholder primacy as a function of economic 
analysis. During the 1980s and 1990s, it spawned two contrasting lines 
of legal theory. One line depicts corporations as entirely ancillary and 
subject to market forces, subsuming both the organizations and the 
corporate law framework into a picture of market discipline. A 
contrasting and more widely accepted approach bemoans the absence 
of market control of management power and goes on to problematize 
the legal framework, recommending law reform toward the end 
realizing shareholder primacy in practice as well as in theory.  
A. Managerialism and Anti-Managerialism 
1. The Managerialist Era. 
The first exhaustive diagnosis of the management accountability 
problem appeared during the depths of the Depression with the 
publication of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.7 Berle and Means described a 
separation of ownership and control—the shareholders owned but could 
not control, due to dispersed holdings and resulting collective action 
problems. Managers accordingly wielded considerable power in the 
economy and the polity without the wholesome accountability that 
befalls a property owner.8  
Management unaccountability would remain a central and 
constant question in academic corporate law. But, at least during the 
quarter century that followed World War II, the edge of policy concern 
was much softened. Corporate managers enjoyed great prestige as the 
 
 7. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that economic power had concentrated in the 
hands of corporate managers and that the corporate system amounted to a major social 
institution).  
 8. Id. at 1–2, 4–5, 7–9, 13–35. 
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successful planners of an expanding economy.9 Most observers agreed 
that management power ineluctably flowed from organizational 
expertise and that structural impediments foreclosed the possibility of 
putting hierarchical firms under market control.10 Few bemoaned the 
apparent absence of market constraints—based on the experience of the 
Great Depression, most people thought of markets as prone to fail in 
any event.  
The microeconomics of the day supported the point. 
Microeconomic theory focuses on markets, and, prior to the mid-1970s, 
economists tended to situate the large corporations outside of markets 
and to theorize about the line of division between the two. The earliest 
exercise in drawing a line between market coordination and production 
in firms came from Ronald Coase in a famous essay published in 1937.11 
Coase posited that if markets held out a framework conducive to 
complex production, then actors could be expected to produce based on 
individual transactions in markets and firms would not exist. But firms 
did exist and production occurred in firms. For an explanation, Coase 
looked to transaction costs. Production through individual market 
contracts would be too expensive, for organizing production through the 
price mechanism meant incurring the cost of ascertaining the prices;12 
furthermore, long-term relationships would be difficult to sustain.13 
Hierarchical structure reduces these costs, facilitating complex 
economic endeavor by turning coordination over to an entrepreneur.14 
Management empowerment, while problematic, was unavoidable 
because the markets were intrinsically incapable of providing an 
environment conducive to complex production.  
The accountability problem identified by Berle and Means still 
followed. But during the post-war era Berle himself pronounced the 
problem to have been solved. In Berle’s view, the post–New Deal 
regulatory state adequately controlled the managers’ behavior and kept 
them responsive to constituent demands.15 He simultaneously 
 
 9. ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 83, 89–91 (1963) (describing an 
“American economic republic” in which the state and the economy were interdependent, with the 
state taking ultimate responsibility for economic results and exercising the higher level of power).  
 10. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989) (describing management’s power over the processes of 
production and distribution, its control over hierarchical bureaucracies, and its imposition of 
externalities on those outside the entities). 
 11. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 12. Id. at 390. 
 13. Id. at 391–92. 
 14. Id. at 392. 
 15. BERLE, supra note 9, at 99, 169 (noting that the state intervened only to stabilize the 
organizational lines and performance of private producers and that managers, in order to keep the 
state at bay, were forced to keep the public satisfied with jobs and growth). Thus constrained, 
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dismissed dispersed shareholders as having no positive governance 
contribution to make.16 They played their only economic role as wealthy 
consumers. They supported their families, they supported social welfare 
programs as taxpayers, and they supported charities as donors.17 As 
such they were entitled to society’s thanks, but not its political 
solicitude. 
It was an environment in which corporate law fell back from the 
policy margin. Indeed, it came to be viewed as a backwater. In 1962, 
Bayless Manning, one of the era’s prominent corporate law academics, 
pronounced corporate law dead as a field of intellectual effort, a dry as 
dust doctrinal inheritance lacking in policy salience.18 No 
reinvigorating reference over to microeconomics would be made until 
the late 1970s.  
2. Reversal of Fortune 
The managerialist era ended abruptly when the economic bill for 
the Vietnam War came due in 1972 and 1973. The stock market 
collapsed and the economy went into a severe recession aggravated by 
the mid-east oil crisis.19 The appearance of international competition in 
manufactured goods added to a growing list of chronic problems.20 The 
stock market did not really recover until August of 1982—a whole 
decade in which there was no money to be made investing long-term in 
equities even as inflation rose steeply. The malaise, called “stagflation,” 
undermined the economic assumptions of the managerialist era.21 
People started to ask questions about how well managers were doing 
their jobs,22 questions that began with the sudden collapse of the once-
 
managers amounted to quasi-civil servants. Id. at 89–90. Berle’s description had a theoretical 
counterpart in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967), which leaves the 
competing groups free to make their own rules, subject to government intervention to assure that 
excessive power does not accrue to one group. 
 16. Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at 
xxiii (rev. ed. 1967). 
 17. See BERLE, supra note 9, at 51–53 (discussing welfare by the state and community). 
 18. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (“[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the 
United States.”). 
 19. GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS 
OF A NEW ECONOMY 47 (2016). 
 20. Id. at 55–56. 
 21. Id. at 55. 
 22. Id. at 56. 
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great Penn Central Railroad in 197023 and intensified as bad results 
accumulated. 
The conceptual framework surrounding corporations changed 
substantially as a result. The happy story of managers as capable 
technocrats who enhance social welfare under the watchful eye of the 
big stick state no longer resonated. Unbridled management power came 
back to the forefront as a problem in need of solution and “corporate 
governance” was invented to tackle the job.24 The first fully developed 
text on the subject, Melvin Eisenberg’s The Structure of the 
Corporation,25 appeared in 1976. Eisenberg synthesized and materially 
advanced a generation of thinking about the deficiencies of the 
corporation’s received legal model.26 For a corrective mechanism, he 
turned to the board of directors, theretofore thought to be a moribund 
institution.27 If we scaled down the demands we placed on it and 
successfully required it to monitor management performance (as 
opposed to taking a leadership role in hands-on management), 
corporate performance would improve.28 The monitoring function in 
turn required independent directors and a committee structure keyed 
to monitoring functions.29 The approach caught on quickly. The 
independent board became so salient as to become a target of 
management capture: The Business Roundtable, seeking to stave off 
more intrusive initiatives then in circulation, publicly embraced the 
independent director majority in 1978.30  
Corporate law was back at the policy margin. 
 
 23. See STAFF REP. OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N TO THE H.R. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, 92D CONG., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY 170–72 
(Subcomm. Print 1972) (discussing the fall of the Penn Central Railroad). 
 24. The phrase “corporate governance” had its first published appearance only in 1972. See 
Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 373–375 (2016) 
(“[T]he New York Times featured the phrase as early as 1972.”).  
 25. See EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 162–70. Eisenberg’s monitoring model of the board of 
directors has ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance. 
 26. See id. at 139–85 (discussing additional rules and structure for corporate governance). 
 27. See id. (discussing additional structure for board of directors and management). 
 28. See id. at 156–57 (discussing the function of the board of directors). 
 29. See id. at 162–68 (emphasizing the monitoring function of the board). 
 30. See Bus. Roundtable, Statement, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of 
the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2092–93 (1978) (proposing reforms to 
encourage more independent directors). Skeptics took the view that management capture was the 
end in view: so long as incumbent CEOs could use their influence to secure appointment of 
cooperative types, any threat was minimal. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—
Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610–12 (1982) (describing the pattern 
of cooperation and management control of appointments). 
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B. Agency Theory and Contractarianism 
The 1970s stagflation also undermined confidence in the 
regulatory state. People were ready to return their trust to markets. A 
second text published in 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, was there to greet them.31   
Jensen and Meckling’s principal-agent model tells a corporate 
creation story in which the only problem confronting the firm is 
management moral hazard, which causes agency costs. It is a partial 
equilibrium set up: but for management moral hazard and 
shareholders’ and managers’ arrangements in respect thereof, all other 
things are equal and efficient. Hence, the entire focus is on the 
shareholder-manager relationship. 
In the model, agency costs are reduced to the extent that 
managers find it cost effective to incur bonding costs and investors find 
it cost effective to incur monitoring costs.32 A possibility is held open 
that contracting between managers and investors will yield further cost 
reductive results, contracting that occurs at the moment a founder-
manager conducts an initial public offering (“IPO”) and creates a public 
corporation.33 The model does not predict that bonding, monitoring, and 
contracting will reduce agency costs to zero—residual agency costs that 
cannot be cost-effectively eliminated will persist as an intrinsic cost of 
production.34 The persistent residuum is unproblematic because, in the 
model, the equity trading market allocates these costs to the founder-
manager at the moment of creation.35 All of this had a surprising 
implication: between markets and contracts, the main problems 
addressed in corporate law were being solved. 
The principal-agent model minimizes the importance of 
authority and hierarchy in the description of corporate production, 
redirecting our attention to contracts between the managers and 
outside providers of equity capital. The shift of perspective deflects the 
Coasian theory of the firm, making it possible to show that private 
ordering in capital markets works effectively to discipline corporate 
governance. More particularly, market trading prices management 
moral hazard and allocates its cost. And, in cases where markets do not 
 
 31. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 32. Id. at 323–26. 
 33. Id. at 319–23. 
 34. Id. at 327. 
 35. Id. at 313, 318–19. 
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work, private contracting comes to the fore to solve any problems.36 The 
Coasian production hierarchy has not exactly disappeared. It just no 
longer matters.  
The model incorporates shareholder primacy, but as an 
assumption rather than as a result. It assumes that all parties 
connected to the firm other than the shareholders and managers 
already possess complete, maximizing contracts and that as between 
managers and shareholders, management moral hazard is the sole 
source of contractual incompleteness.37 From this, it automatically 
follows that whatever minimizes the effects of moral hazard 
automatically maximizes both shareholder return and overall welfare. 
Meanwhile, the model assumes away everything in corporate 
governance other than the management-shareholder conflict of 
interest, manager-shareholder contracting with respect thereto, and 
the stock market’s ability to price out the conflict.  
This spare microeconomic model held out a blank canvas on 
which legal theorists could paint in descriptions suited to their 
normative priors. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel did just that, 
turning what is implicit in the model into a sequence of normative 
assertions for legal contexts.38 This “contractarian” restatement 
mightily expanded the model’s field of application. 
The Easterbrook and Fischel model quietly relaxes the model’s 
limiting assumptions to accommodate the real-world corporate 
governance framework. The “contract” grows. It is now not just the 
result of face-to-face bargaining at the moment the public firm is 
created through an IPO, but also corporate law itself and internal 
corporate legislation enacted over time.39 The model also expands the 
set of market controls of agency costs. In addition to stock market 
 
 36. Note that the authority structures in firms do not disappear. There is instead a change 
in the characterization of what it means to be a hierarchical inferior. For Coase, this implied a 
sacrifice of liberty that required explanation. For Jensen and Meckling, the hierarchical inferior is 
a contract counterparty who can always walk away. Id. at 310–11. Jensen and Meckling here 
repeat a point made earlier by Alchian and Demsetz. Firms, said the latter pair, have “no power 
of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action[.] [They do not differ] in the slightest degree from 
ordinary market contracting between any two people.” Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972). 
 37. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 312–18, 326. 
 38. The arbitrage was effected in a series of articles. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) 
[hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Contract]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). The initial cross-
reference occurred in Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate 
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1978). 
 39. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1429–31. 
Bratton Team Production Revisted 0929 (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2021 10:09 AM 
2021] VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 111 
pricing, it relies on the market for corporate control (also known as 
hostile takeovers), the product markets, and executive labor markets. 
The four markets operate together to assure agency cost minimization 
on a multi-period basis.40   
Two broad claims about corporate law follow. First, there should 
be a presumption against having any more corporate law than already 
exists. Because rational actors arrange governance in contracts and 
markets price the contract terms, legal mandates are justifiable only in 
the unlikely event that “the terms chosen by firms are both unpriced 
and systematically perverse from investors’ standpoints.”41 Second, the 
inherited corporate law regime is economically rational,42 justifying a 
strong normative presumption in its favor. The two claims, taken 
together, ratified corporate law’s status quo, a natural result in a 
framework asserting the evolutionary dominance of maximizing 
arrangements.  
Easterbrook and Fischel’s arbitrage of economic agency to legal 
policy was controversial, and never gained ascendance in all 
particulars. The sticking point was the capacious notion of contract, 
which encompasses all interaction between managers, investors, 
consumers, and the government in a multi-period, dynamic setting that 
features few actual negotiations.43 Microeconomics does not go nearly 
this far in describing contracts. Its only addition to out-of-market 
exchange by direct negotiation is a category of “relational” contracts,44 
a category not nearly big enough to fill the category devised under 
contractarianism.  
The question was whether the territory of “contract,” with its 
arm’s-length bargains and equally situated parties, plausibly covered 
the entire ground swept in by the Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
contractarian firm, much of which was manifestly hierarchical in 
character and displayed persistent accountability problems at the top. 
The consensus answer was that contractual characterization was 
insufficiently robust to justify turning corporate law into a 
thoroughgoing default regime—fiduciary duties would have to remain 
 
 40. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 4, 18–21, 91, 93, 96–97. Reliance on a market 
triad (control, product, and employment) to control management antedates Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s arbitrage of Jensen and Meckling. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262–70 (1977). 
 41. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 21. Easterbrook and Fischel make a strong 
claim for institutional primacy for the market price without also making a claim for strong market 
price efficiency. Id. at 18–19. 
 42. Id. at 315.  
 43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1428–34. 
 44. See Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 835–36 
(2003). 
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mandatory because proxy voting was not a process context suited to 
effective noncompetitive transacting.45 
Still, even with only partial acceptance, the contractarian 
paradigm precipitated fundamental changes in the way people view 
corporate law. Henceforth, policy discussions would proceed in a 
microeconomic framework dominated by two normative 
presumptions—a presumption disfavoring new regulatory initiatives to 
control management and entity behavior and a presumption favoring 
private contracting and market control.  
C. The Shareholder Paradigm 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work appeared even as the hostile 
takeovers of the 1980s assailed managers and transformed corporate 
law. The takeovers imported credibility to their novel perspective. 
Easterbrook and Fischel, by folding the market for corporate control 
into Jensen and Meckling’s moral hazard account, produced a neat 
explanation of what was going on in the real world: moral hazard had 
caused agency costs to run to excess and discounted stock prices 
reflected the value impairment. The discounts in turn attracted control 
bidders by assuring an arbitrage profit, with the market-based control 
transfer performing a critical agency cost reductive role.46 An account 
based on market control suddenly seemed plausible. The takeover boom 
denuded management of insulation from market pressure, 
demonstrating the power and transformative potential of capital 
market inputs for the first time since the early twentieth century. The 
takeovers also brought forward the shareholders as the primary 
 
 45. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 924 (1988) (arguing that 
corporate adoption of contract law makes opting out of default rules difficult); Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1574–80 (1989) (discussing 
the drawbacks to shareholder voting rights); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619–20 (1989) 
(arguing for judicial involvement in contracting); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of 
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462–63, 1486–89 (1989). 
 46. Viewed retrospectively, Jensen and Meckling’s theory is unlikely to be satisfactory as a 
standalone explanation for 1980s takeovers—the empirical profile holds out a much richer 
collection of causative factors. See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? 
Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 
3, 29 (1995) (looking at a range of factors—including ownership, abnormal return, sales growth, 
leverage, Tobin’s q ratio, market to book value ratio, and size—to predict the likelihood that a firm 
will become a hostile target and finding that size is the only consistently successful predictor); 
Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and 
Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 195–96 (1996) (observing that mergers come in waves 
and focus on specific industries).  
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corporate constituents, ushering in a new era of solicitude of their 
interests. Easterbrook and Fischel put agency theory at their service. 
 The takeovers ceased in the wake of the economic collapse of 
1989 and then failed to restart in tandem with economic recovery a 
couple of years later. A public choice story circulated to explain this,47 
ascribing the takeover’s diminished salience to higher regulatory 
barriers. It followed that a takeover-centric view of corporate 
governance remained appropriate: takeovers were deemed an essential 
means to the end of agency cost reduction long after they disappeared 
in the real world.48 It also followed that in the post-takeover era agency 
costs were chronically and suboptimally high. 
A reformulation of the contractarian paradigm naturally 
followed. Contractarianism had borrowed the microeconomics of the 
principal-agent model to describe highly successful private ordering, a 
story that lost plausibility once nefarious managers and corrupt 
politicians choked off the leading market control. It followed that 
private ordering could not by itself assure an efficient governance 
system. The adjusted account retained the principal-agent model’s 
exclusive focus on management moral hazard along with an 
information-efficient account of stock market pricing. But now, instead 
of a contracting field conducive to efficient self-correction, we had a field 
riven with collective action problems, path dependencies, and other 
failures.49 There is no generally-accepted label for this perspective. For 
convenience, it will be referred to here as the “shareholder paradigm.”  
Regulation came back into the picture as a result, but for the 
limited purpose of adjusting the corporate process framework so that 
market control could work in fact and finally get us to the partial 
equilibrium result posited at the start by Jensen and Meckling. 
Shareholders should exercise “ultimate control” of the firm,50 but were 
 
 47. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 457, 457 (1988) (managers seeking renewed insulation from the markets went to state 
legislatures and appealed to state judiciaries to promote antitakeover statutes and otherwise 
validate takeover defensive measures). 
 48. See Guhan Subramanian, A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal 
Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 383, 397 (1998); 
Comment & Schwert, supra note 46, at 5, 28, 33 (large-sample evidence “provides little support for 
the proposition that modern antitakeover measures have been used to deter takeovers 
systematically”). 
 49. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
641, 644–45 (1996) (outlining how path-dependent histories lead to missed modern adaptations); 
see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 161–62 (1999) (arguing that contracting around mandatory 
rules is unrealistically costly—or even impossible). 
 50. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001).  
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not doing so. Corporate governance needed positive law reforms to bring 
this about.51 Removal of antitakeover barriers not being politically 
feasible, the policy agenda looked toward “shareholder empowerment” 
more generally. Management needed to be forced to yield to shareholder 
inputs on governance and business planning on a going concern basis. 
That information asymmetries might impair the quality of any 
shareholder inputs was not deemed to be a salient problem, for a 
market-based performance metric was available—the stock price.52 
Everything in corporate governance thereby came down to a single real-
world instruction—manage to maximize the market price of the stock.  
D. Shareholder Primacy 
Shareholder primacy is a tie that binds together Jensen and 
Meckling’s model, Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism, and the 
shareholder paradigm. Recall that in Jensen and Meckling it operates 
at the level of an assumption: if we model the firm as a nexus of 
complete contracts among all parties involved while modeling the 
contract between a firm and its shareholders as incomplete (in that the 
shareholders claim the residual return after all other contractual 
claims have been met), maximization of shareholder value 
automatically follows as the economically efficient result.53 The 
assumption’s plausibility depends entirely on the model of constituent 
contracts: if all contracts other than the shareholders’ are complete and 
embody a maximizing trade for each party, then maximizing the 
shareholders’ residual return does maximize value for all concerned. 
The problem is that no one thinks that in the real world other 
stakeholders enter into complete contracts.  
To surmount this problem, shareholder primacy’s proponents 
make a two-part robustness case. The first part is a fallback claim for 
shareholder entitlement in a world in which incomplete contracts are 
ubiquitous: relatively speaking, the shareholder’s contract holds out 
less in the way of protection than do the other constituents’ contracts. 
Employees can look to alternative employment at their opportunity 
wage in competitive labor markets and creditors can take security or 
 
 51. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (recommending expansion of the zone shareholder legislative access to 
the corporate charter and the state of incorporation decision); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. Rev. 675, 700–01 (2007) (recommending a right to replace all 
incumbents every two or three years). 
 52. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 440–41. 
 53. Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 8–9 (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abs=343461 
[https://perma.cc/QMU5-PMMS].  
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shorten their maturities, while shareholders’ capital is locked in for an 
indefinite duration with their only further protection stemming from 
governance arrangements. A claim to pride of place in the legal model 
follows from the diagnosis of relative vulnerability.54  
The second part of the case references alternatives to a 
shareholder maxim and finds them wanting. The argument proceeds in 
two phases. It is first asserted that decisionmaking costs should be 
minimized. This in turn implies a limitation on the number of 
constituents referenced in the firm’s objective function.55 Multi-
constituent models invite incoherence due to conflict amongst the 
interests referenced. Incoherence in turn expands the scope of 
management discretion, potentially increasing management agency 
costs.56 Second, the shareholders are the best reference point among the 
available constituents. As they hold the residual claim, managing in 
their interest maximizes returns for the corporation as a whole.57 
Moreover, their capital investment in the residual lends them an 
undiluted, pure financial incentive to maximize the firm’s value.58 From 
an incentive point of view, they contrast favorably against managers 
and independent directors, whose incentives are comprised by interests 
in compensation and job retention, and against other constituents, 
whose contractual interests exclude the residual upside.59  
II. THE MODEL 
Blair and Stout intervened just as the shareholder paradigm 
emerged as corporate law’s consensus view. Their TPM challenged the 
consensus by widening the descriptive lens. Where the agency models 
look only at the shareholder-management contract, the TPM looks at 
the contracts between the corporation and all capital providers, both 
financial and human. Where agency models look for value enhancement 
only through agency cost reduction, the TPM looks to the production 
 
 54. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210–11, 1227–29 
(1984) (describing the shareholders as having a unique position as regards the firm). 
 55. Becht et al., supra note 53, at 9. 
 56. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9, 13 (2001) (“Stakeholder theory directs corporate 
managers to serve ‘many masters.’ And, to paraphrase the old adage, when there are many 
masters, all end up being shortchanged.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 449. 
 58. Id.  
 59. For a caveat, see Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and 
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSPS. 
121, 138 (2001) (suggesting that market shareholders have an advantage in moving capital from 
declining to rising industries but that managers and employees have decisive expertise as regards 
technologies, products, and processes).  
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side to encourage firm-specific investment. The TPM also deemphasizes 
market control, reviving the Coasian stress on hierarchical 
relationships independent of markets.  
This Part describes the model. It outlines the economic 
assertions in Section II.A, including a look at the economic literature 
from which the model draws. Section II.B reviews the model’s 
innovative treatment of the corporate law inheritance.  
A. Economics 
1. Outline 
The TPM explains the corporation’s legal framework by 
reference to the production function, which is said to require the 
investment and coordinated effort of the multiple individuals and 
groups that make up a team. The investments are firm specific—they 
cannot be pulled back out and are non-separable, which means that 
valuable project attributes cannot be traced back to individual inputs.60 
A contractibility problem results. If, once a project gets underway, there 
is no way to connect the inputs of team members to particular project 
returns, there is no way to draft an ex ante contract that specifies an ex 
post division of the economic surpluses generated by the project (termed 
“rents”). The contract is going to have to specify an allocation ex ante or 
establish a process that effectuates an allocation ex post.  
Suppose the participants draft ex ante a formula that fixes 
returns ex post. This solution invites slacking off—a team member with 
a pre-set return has an incentive to take a free ride, reducing its capital 
contribution given imperfect monitoring and information asymmetries. 
Now assume instead that the team proceeds without a pre-set allocative 
scheme or governance regime, deferring the matter for ex post 
negotiation. This invites opportunistic rent-seeking, a debilitating 
scenario that dissipates the project’s positive returns.61 It follows, say 
Blair and Stout, that the allocative problem is noncontractible. To make 
team production work, the team members must consent in advance to 
a governance structure—an organizational design that provides a 
confidence-inspiring means of effecting ex post allocations of rents.62 
At this point Blair and Stout give us their creation story. The 
team members, who include providers of financial capital as well as 
providers of human capital, give up their property rights in their capital 
 
 60. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249. 
 61. Id. at 249. 
 62. Id. at 250. 
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inputs and their rights to returns from the firm’s output to a corporate 
entity. The corporation is in turn governed by a mediating hierarchy, 
which coordinates inputs, allocates proceeds, and mediates disputes. 
The corporation’s board of directors sits at the hierarchy’s peak. Its 
members are neither owners nor agents. Instead, they are trustees for 
the benefit of the corporate entity,63 representing the interests of all 
team members and not just of the shareholders.64  
The board wields absolute power over the entity’s assets, and, 
importantly, must be independent of the individuals and groups in the 
team.65 Thus described, the board’s function is not to reduce agency 
costs of management but to encourage firm-specific investment. The 
board’s job is to protect team members’ investments, whether of 
financial or human capital, rather than to maximize shareholder 
value.66 It follows that the board cannot be under the control of either 
the shareholders or the other stakeholders67 and that shareholder value 
enhancement should not be held out as the purpose of the public 
corporation.68 
Two additional specifications should be mentioned, one going to 
agency costs and the other to allocative outcomes. There is no prediction 
that agency costs will be reduced to zero. Although the board is 
independent, perfect incentive incompatibility should not be expected, 
given small capital stakes and rational self-interest. At the same time, 
team membership does not imply a right to a particular share of 
proceeds. The members are incented to stay on the team so long as 
individual gains from the overall arrangement exceed the foregone costs 
of slacking off and rent seeking.69 Disparate allocations can occur given 
large returns, allocations subject to the politics of the moment.70  
Blair and Stout, summing up, describe the TPM as a second-best 
solution to a problem that resists an optimal solution.71 
 
 63. Id. at 280–81. 
 64. Id. at 286. 
 65. Id. at 251. The TPM’s description does not imply hands on management by the board. 
Most production decisions are made down the hierarchical line through the collegial interaction of 
team members, who have every incentive to solve their own problems (including allocational 
problems) and keep the board at a distance. The board is more of a final authority, held in reserve 
for resolution of intractable problems. Id. at 282.  
 66. Id. at 253. 
 67. Id. at 254. 
 68. Id. at 253. 
 69. Id. at 283. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 284. 
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2. Derivation 
The TPM is original. As such, it differs from most law and 
economics, which gets its theory by means of cross-disciplinary 
arbitrage based on a completed analysis. But the TPM also has deep 
roots the microeconomic literature.  
Blair and Stout explain why the usual arbitrage is not an option. 
They divide the field of economic theory of the firm into two schools, 
agency and property rights, neither of which, they tell us, gets it right. 
Agency theory, with its focus on delegations from principals to agents 
and exclusive stress on agency cost reduction,72 fails to see the 
principal-agent contract as a two-way street. The problems do not lie 
exclusively with slacking and self-dealing by the agent at the principal’s 
expense. The agent might in turn have problems getting the principal 
to perform her end of the deal.73 Property rights theory, in contrast, 
problematizes incomplete contracting amongst firm participants and 
fills the void by assigning property rights, also known as control, to a 
participant, usually the equity holder.74 Here the problem lies in the 
transition to the context of corporate law, which does not vest 
shareholders with a property right to control.75 
  Blair and Stout then accurately describe the result of the 
arbitrage of these economic observations to corporate legal theory. The 
microeconomics of agency and property rights are fused into a single 
convergent description of the corporation. This depicts a top-down firm 
hierarchy with the shareholders at the top, delegating authority to the 
board, which delegates on to the top officers and so on down the line.76 
Thus modeled, the firm’s only problem lies in assuring optimal 
performance by the delegee-agents.   
A more cogent model, say Blair and Stout, eliminates the 
shareholder principal and shifts attention from vertical relationships in 
the hierarchy to the horizontal relationships of team members. They 
build on the assertion by drawing three notions from the existing 
literature: (1) that production calls for teamwork, (2) that allocational 
problems among providers of capital are debilitating, and (3) 
 
 72. Id. at 258–59. 
 73. Id. at 259. 
 74. Id. at 259–60 (citing, inter alia, Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
1119, 1120 (1990)). 
 75. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 260.  
 76. Id. at 262–63 (terming this the “grand-design principal-agent model”). 
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monitoring and allocational functions are best vested in a neutral 
rather than in a capital provider.77  
Blair and Stout extract a definition of team production from 
Alchian and Demsetz’s 1972 model.78 But they otherwise keep their 
distance, and for good reason. Alchian and Demsetz solve the team 
production problem with a monitor who employs all other team 
members under complete market contracts, dispensing with 
hierarchical power relationships.79 The model is the earliest exemplar 
of a model of the firm operated through market contracting. In the 
history of theory of the firm, it holds a place as a precursor80 to Jensen 
and Meckling.   
Blair and Stout then turn to property rights models, drilling 
down on Bengt Holmstrom’s 1982 model of contractual incompleteness 
in a production context.81 Holmstrom attempted to model a monitoring 
arrangement that simultaneously controlled shirking under 
asymmetric information and allocated proceeds. He did not succeed, 
with the model’s interest lying in its explanation of the reasons for its 
own failure. The lesson was that an ex ante allocation triggered 
shirking, which could be punished only by an across-the-board 
withholding of proceeds, which in turn led to opportunism on the 
monitor’s part. The solution to the problem lay in a mechanism for an 
incentive compatible outside monitor,82 with Holmstrom suggesting 
that outside shareholders in public companies might be viable 
candidates for the job.83  
Holmstrom set the stage for Blair and Stout’s final move, for he 
conjoined hierarchical monitoring and allocational problems and rent 
seeking at the production level to present an unsolved, incomplete 
contracting problem. Blair and Stout fold in the team notion to suggest 
that the team members have a mutual interest in minimizing shirking 
and rent seeking and can solve their problem by transferring control to 
a neutral third party, the mediating hierarch.84 Here they draw support 
 
 77. Id. at 264–69. 
 78. Id. at 265–66 (quoting Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 36, at 779) (“In [their] paper, 
[Alchian & Demsetz] defined team production as ‘production in which 1) several types of resources 
are used . . . 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 
3) not all resources used in team production belong to one person.’ ”). 
 79. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 36, at 778, 781–82. 
 80. Bratton, supra note 10, at 415. 
 81. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 324–25 (1982). 
 82. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 268–69. 
 83. Holmstrom, supra note 81, at 338–39. 
 84. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 271.  
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from a Rajan and Zingales85 model of two parties making a firm-specific 
investment. The model shows that vesting control rights in either party 
chills investment on both sides. It thus does not make sense to vest 
control in the party with the most capital at stake. Better to find a third 
party who makes no firm-specific investment, securing decision services 
with a nominal slice of the project’s returns.86  
We reach Blair and Stout’s bottom line at this point: rational 
team members submit to hierarchical control not for the hierarch’s 
benefit, but for their own.87 Providers of human and financial capital 
need a hierarch to perform the function of gathering information and to 
monitor against shirking.88 But they cannot assume the role of 
hierarchical principals themselves. They accordingly give up their 
property rights in their capital to an economically neutral 
decisionmaking process,89 a process that encourages cooperation and 
firm-specific investment.90 
 B. Law 
The TPM is unique in drawing on the legal inheritance as an 
affirmative input in an economic model of the firm. Elsewhere in the 
law and economics literature, the economic model comes first, with the 
theorist then laying it on top of the legal model, claiming consonance 
where plausible but, given dissonance, asserting that economic analysis 
highlights a legal infirmity. The TPM, in contrast, looks to the legal 
model for inspiration, in particular its provision of a board of directors 
without a principal. Blair and Stout simultaneously draw on the law to 
support the model’s economic description and draw on the model’s 
economics to explicate the law.  
The legal inheritance does, in fact, yield deep support for the 
TPM. Corporate boards exercise “original and undelegated” powers.91 
To file a charter and incorporate is to untap a direct delegation of 
authority from the state to the corporate board to do business, authority 
 
 85. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 
392 (1998). 
 86. Id. at 422. 
 87. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 274. 
 88. Id. at 278. 
 89. Id. at 285. 
 90. Id. at 277. 
 91. See, e.g., People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (quoting Hoyt v. 
Thompson’s Ex’r, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859)). 
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that vests before the issuance of any shares.92 Voting power to select 
board members is indeed vested in the shareholders.93 But this grant 
does not give the shareholders the power to issue management 
instructions to the board.94 Absent such a power, there is no agency 
relationship—period.  An analogy to the legal relations of trustees and 
beneficiaries works much better. But, even given a shift over to a trust 
model, corporate law imposes no duty on its director-trustees to 
maximize for the shareholders. Instead, directors owe their fiduciary 
duties to the corporate entity. In Blair and Stout’s description, they are 
independent hierarchs who pursue the “interests of the corporation,” 
which they further describe as “a joint welfare function of all the 
individuals who make firm-specific investments and agree to 
participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation process within 
the firm.”95  
Blair and Stout take this legal structure and run with it. They 
show us that it is not some hoary conceptual inheritance that can be 
dispensed with as we modernize to a principal-agent framework. In 
their picture, corporate fiduciary law assimilates the structure and 
carries it to a logical conclusion, according the board a protected zone 
within which to make allocative decisions.96 The zone of discretion 
partly results from the operation of the business judgment rule, which 
prevents litigating shareholders from second-guessing management 
decisions gone wrong, and partly results from the operation of the duty 
of loyalty, which is sparing in its articulation of prohibited, self-
interested conduct on the directors’ parts.  
The duty of loyalty discussion is noteworthy. Blair and Stout 
point out that even as self-dealing contracts can trigger a breach of the 
duty, many actions that are manifestly self-interested escape 
scrutiny.97 Defensive measures against a hostile tender offer are a 
leading example.98 Investments and acquisitions that make the firm 
bigger and safer for the benefit of internal constituents but at a sacrifice 
of shareholder value are another.99 Neither traverse the duty to the 
corporation even as they manifestly injure the shareholders’ economic 
 
 92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 102(a)(6), 108, 152 (2021) (the first things that happen upon 
incorporation are the appointment of the board of directors and approval of the bylaws; the board 
then approves the terms of the issue of stock). 
 93. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 291. 
 94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (the board manages the business unless the charter 
provides otherwise). 
 95. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 288. 
 96. Id. at 298–309. 
 97. Id. at 305–09. 
 98. Id. at 307–08. 
 99. Id. at 306–07. 
Bratton Team Production Revisted 0929 (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2021 10:09 AM 
122 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:nnn 
interests. The fact that generations of academic colleagues have 
excoriated these features of the fiduciary landscape does not bother 
Blair and Stout. Far from it—one senses that they relish the exercise of 
bringing disfavored cases and statutes into the center of an economic 
theory of the corporation.  
There are sticking points, of course. The shareholder derivative 
action is one: shareholders are the only constituents with standing to 
enforce fiduciary law against directors, a privilege implying fiduciary 
beneficiary status. Blair and Stout push back against the implication 
with expedient points, but the points are fair and add up. The 
shareholders, they say, have standing not because they enjoy the 
juridical status of beneficiaries, but because, as the holders of residual 
economic interest in the corporation’s returns, they are the constituents 
best suited to take the enforcement role.100 Their standing, moreover, is 
contingent. Given insolvency, the creditors step into the economic shoes 
of the residual interest holder and litigation standing comes with it.101 
Meanwhile, procedural stumbling blocks work to assure that any 
interventions by particular shareholders operate for the benefit of the 
corporation as a whole,102 as does the rule on damages, which channels 
the proceeds of a judgment to the corporation’s bank account.103 
The other, even bigger sticking point is shareholder voting, 
which also implies beneficiary status. Blair and Stout deploy a similar 
strategy against this implication. First comes a negative. Shareholder 
voting rights are in practice so weak as not to implicate control; the 
board, which controls the proxy solicitation process, in effect elects 
itself.104 Two positives follow. The vote needs to be vested somewhere, 
lest the board become a self-perpetuating oligarch. Shareholders, with 
their interest in maximizing their shares’ value, are less likely to be 
motivated by rent-seeking than are the competing stakeholder 
groups.105 Blair and Stout follow up by drawing on a prominent point in 
the shareholder primacy case: compared to other stakeholders, 
shareholders have a weak position when it comes to contracting into 
slices of corporate pie. Managers and employees do their rent-seeking 
on the inside. Public shareholders, in contrast are outside and thus 
positioned suffer from informational asymmetries and labor under an 
intrinsic collective action problem. With voting rights, the legal model, 
 
 100. Id. at 289. 
 101. Id. at 295–97. 
 102. Id. at 293–94. 
 103. Id. at 294–95. 
 104. Id. at 310–12. 
 105. Id. at 313 & n.175 (citing HANSMANN, supra note 6, at 97–98). 
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in effect, makes a give back that evens their position vis-à-vis interior 
stakeholders.106  
These treatments will not satisfy shareholder advocates, who 
will insist that the points favoring shareholders be carried to a logical 
conclusion. They look at the legal model and ask: “Who should be in and 
who should be out?” The ins are the common shareholders, the preferred 
shareholders (on limited fact patterns), and the creditors in the wake of 
insolvency, and for the same reasons given by Blair and Stout in their 
explanation of derivative standing and voting rights. All other 
stakeholders are out and are not corporate law beneficiaries.  Blair and 
Stout, in contrast, get past this mode of thinking by reminding us that 
the corporate entity is “in” first and foremost. This move expands the 
beneficiary envelope and integrates the TPM and the inherited legal 
model.  
A follow up question arises: “Who is on the team and who is not?” 
Blair and Stout leave the question unanswered—management, 
employees, and common equity clearly are members; other stakeholders 
like creditors and the local community may be members.107 The 
hesitancy is understandable. A long-term lender parts with capital that 
is sunk into a firm-specific project, just as does a purchaser of a share 
in an IPO. Yet while the shareholders get protective participatory 
rights, the lenders have a near-complete contract negotiated at arm’s 
length, inclusive of a power to extract the monetary value of the sunk 
capital by force (and necessitating a costly defensive bankruptcy regime 
in response). A capital contributor thus situated does not bear the 
earmarks of a team member, as defined. A supplier of firm-specific 
goods or a long-term, dependent customer whose account requires 
extensive servicing might make a more viable candidate, but, 
depending on the situation, need not. Outside of the core group, then, 
team membership is fact dependent, and left to the management of the 
mediating hierarch. Blair and Stout are right to leave the point open. 
C. Claims 
Blair and Stout make several claims for the model. First, it 
affords a “more appropriate basis” for understanding the functions 
served by the public corporation than does the prevailing principal-
agent model of the firm.108 Second, the model is “consistent with the 
 
 106. Id. at 314. 
 107. Id. at 253, 278. 
 108. Id. at 250. 
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‘nexus of contracts’ approach to understanding corporate law.”109 Third, 
the model subsumes corporate law without dissonance, which similarly 
should be seen as holding out a second-best solution to team production 
problems.110 The Part that follows takes up these claims, passing on the 
first while confirming the second and third.  
III. EVALUATION 
Blair and Stout set themselves the task of articulating a model 
of the public corporation that does three things simultaneously. First, 
the model must be grounded in a microeconomic theory of the firm. 
Second, the model must be consonant with the provisions and structure 
of corporate law. Third, the model must situate the accomplishment of 
productivity outside of the tent of shareholder primacy and market 
control. Blair and Stout succeed at the task described, achieving closure 
for their theory. Indeed, they did something that no one thought could 
be done.  
The discussion that follows expands on these observations. In so 
doing, it does not address Blair and Stout’s first claim—the question 
whether the TPM is correct (or more appropriate) in some sense that 
renders agency theory incorrect (or less appropriate).111 So to do is to 
join a search for the firm’s essential nature, and to draw exclusionary 
lines around the descriptive essence, once established.112 Such exercises 
can be insightful and have been executed with great analytical 
facility.113 Essentialist claiming and counterclaiming is an academic 
pastime drawing many enthusiastic participants. It has a downside, 
however. Essentialism means exclusion that, however convenient as a 
prop to theoretical simplicity,114 leads to inaccuracy. In legal contexts, 
bad policy follows.  
 
 109. Id. at 254. 
 110. Id. at 250 & n.6 (citing Kelvin Lancaster & Richard G. Lipsey, The General Theory of the 
Second Best, in TRADE, MARKETS AND WELFARE 193, 193–220 (Kelvin Lancaster ed., 1996)). 
 111. Or, alternatively, the question whether agency theory is correct (or more appropriate) in 
some sense that renders the TPM incorrect (or less appropriate). 
 112. Blair and Stout do not make an explicit essentialist claim. But they at times gesture in 
the direction, for example, when they claim that the board’s function is not to reduce agency costs 
of management but to encourage firm-specific investment. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
Nothing in the TPM requires the board to ignore agency costs, even as the model does state that 
agency cost reduction cannot be the board’s exclusive concern. 
 113. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (implicitly countering the TPM by centering the capital 
protection function on asset partitioning). 
 114. Occam’s Razor, etc. Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 462–63 
(2000). The idea is that a simple explanation is superior to a complicated explanation. Many 
subscribe to it.  
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The discussion that follows is accordingly directed to a different 
question. Agency has been and continues to be the dominant paradigm, 
with most observers in the field employing it exclusively. Descriptive 
exclusions do follow. So the question to be addressed is whether the 
TPM is a necessary concomitant.115 Here the answer is a strong 
affirmative. Both approaches focus on critical points of incompleteness 
in corporate contracts, points from which incentive problems and other 
costly frictions tend to emanate. Focusing only on agency (or focusing 
only on team production) leads to descriptive distortion.   
This Part’s discussion also highlights the TPM’s limitations. The 
authors, as they went about dotting all the i’s and crossing all the t’s on 
their way to closure, carefully delimited their model’s field of 
application. Strictly speaking, the TPM is not a theory of the firm but a 
theory of a subset of firms—publicly traded corporations with separated 
ownership and control116 as they appeared at the time Blair and Stout 
wrote in the late 1990s. The limitation bespeaks expedience, but, as we 
will see, also turns out also to enhance the model’s robustness reserves.    
Section III.A evaluates the TPM as economics. Section III.B 
takes up Blair and Stout’s claim that the TPM is contractarian, finding 
the claim to be justified and the TPM to be a more robust contractarian 
exercise than its Chicago forebear. Section III.C enters a caveat to Blair 
and Stout’s doctrinal account. Section III.D situates the TPM in the 
corporate governance environment that prevailed at the time of its 
appearance in the late 1990s. Section III.E considers the implications 
for the TPM of governance developments since the turn of this century. 
A. The TPM as Economics 
Blair and Stout’s model is a milestone in the history of corporate 
law and economics because it is simultaneously methodologically 
correct and normatively contrarian. It deploys rational actors to make 
their own arrangements in a contractarian framework. Yet it 
accommodates group as well as individual interests and privileges a 
zone of discretion for allocational decisionmaking in its description of 
productive arrangements. Before the TPM’s arrival, it looked as if 
 
 115. The question could be phrased more broadly as whether an approach sensitive to internal 
stability and conditions conducive to investment is a necessary concomitant. The TPM is not the 
only such approach. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2010) (stressing information 
asymmetry); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017) (stressing moral hazard on the part of the 
principal). But the TPM is the leading such approach. 
 116. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249 (suggesting that agency theory provides no insight 
into the operation of public corporations even as it is important in understanding other firms). 
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microeconomic methodology, market discipline, and an agency 
description inclusive of shareholder primacy were inextricably bound 
together. Blair and Stout showed that, as a matter of economics, 
shareholder primacy could be cordoned off as a normative assertion 
based on a contestable analysis. They also showed that stock market 
discipline is not the only market discipline pertinent to corporate 
governance. In the TPM’s vision of things, the salient market is the 
product market: you need a well-functioning team to make a 
competitive product, and absent a competitive product you never get to 
the stock market in the first place. By thus separating economic 
methodology from the normative result of shareholder primacy, Blair 
and Stout demonstrated the methodology’s potential to observers with 
a range of normative perspectives. Corporate legal theory emerged with 
a more robust framework of enquiry.    
The TPM does more than separate the methodology from the 
normative result. It also smacks down shareholder primacy as a 
descriptive result. This happens implicitly. The TPM is stated 
affirmatively, as a model should be. The authors do not pause to lay out 
the components of shareholder primacy and rebut them one by one in 
the argumentative style of legal writing. But the affirmative statement 
of the model does indeed rebut.  
Recall that in Jensen and Meckling, shareholder primacy 
operates at the level of assumption—all constituents other than the 
shareholders are assumed to have complete maximizing contracts.117 
For purposes of establishing the point as bedrock theory an affirmative 
case must be made, and not just in legal contexts. There is no 
presumption favoring shareholder primacy in economic theory. In fact, 
the theory is to the contrary. The first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics looks to economic efficiency conceived as maximum 
aggregate wealth.118 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Röell 
restate the theorem for a given system of corporate governance as 
follows: a system is “ex-ante efficient if it generates the highest possible 
payoff for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, 
clients, tax authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by 
the corporation’s actions.”119 This extension is uncontroversial, and, 
unsurprisingly, shows up as the operative objective in the TPM.120 As 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 118. See William W. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient 
Market Control, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 675, 695–96 (2020).  
 119. Becht et al., supra note 53, at 8.  
 120. See supra text accompanying note 95 (noting Blair and Stout’s definition of “interests of 
the corporation” as a joint welfare function). 
Bratton Team Production Revisted 0929 (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2021 10:09 AM 
2021] VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 127 
we have seen,121 shareholder value maximization displaces general 
maximization based on a further, two-part analysis grounded on the 
one hand in shareholder vulnerability and on the other hand in the 
incoherence of stakeholder governance.  
The TPM quietly confronts both legs of this primacy case. It 
begins by undermining the robustness of Jensen and Meckling’s 
assumptions regarding completeness by showing that all team 
members (and not just the shareholders) suffer from an incompleteness 
problem. The model then deals with the shareholder vulnerability point 
by accepting and assimilating it. There is no attempt at denial. Instead, 
vulnerability becomes a justification for shareholder voting rights but 
not a justification for an agency structure incorporating primacy. And 
why not? Implicitly, the model predicts that the costs attending erosion 
of the team’s integrity would be greater than the gains stemming from 
further agency cost reduction.122 Finally, there is the stakeholder 
governance problem. The TPM averts it by refraining from advocating 
stakeholder governance in the first place (even as it does advocate 
consideration of stakeholder interests). Interestingly, the TPM at this 
stage flows in the same stream as shareholder primacy—both hold that 
the company needs a directive and authoritative hierarch in the form of 
a board of directors. The difference is that the TPM board makes its 
own policy where the primacy board is directed to perpend to 
shareholder instructions magically communicated by the stock price.  
A shareholder primacy advocate might take the TPM to task at 
this point in the back-and-forth: even if the foregoing is persuasive, the 
TPM fails because it builds in no metric for evaluating the performance 
of the board and the managers.123 Shareholder primacy, it argues, 
builds in the benefit of the stock price as a one-size-fits-all report card. 
Absent this yardstick, managers cannot be held accountable for 
suboptimal performance.  
A response to this objection is implicit in the TPM. The TPM is 
a model of publicly traded companies—it accordingly does not make the 
stock price somehow disappear. The price stays in the picture as an 
imperfect report card. What it cannot do in the TPM is serve as a one-
size-fits-all maximization metric because it only measures the value of 
the residual equity interest and cannot by itself tell us whether the 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 122. This implicit cost-benefit result also deflects shareholder primacy’s emphasis on the 
shareholders’ pure financial incentives. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 123. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 440–41 (noting that the market price 
of the stock should provide “the principal measure” of the shareholder interest); Jensen, supra note 
56, at 9, 13 (noting that a multi-constituent model invites an increase in management agency 
costs). 
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managers are maximizing welfare. This approach, which does not by 
any stretch assert that the stock price lacks heuristic value, has the 
great benefit of taking the stock price in a broader context. Given 
inevitable information asymmetries between the firm and the market, 
contextualization is necessary in any event.124 This is a cogent response 
to the shareholder proponents’ objection, if not a response so compelling 
as to persuade them to renounce the faith.  
One final point should be made on the TPM as economics. It is 
not a formal model, even as it is derived from a sequence of formal 
models. It accordingly is not quite economics. It is instead law and 
economics, which is not a problem so far as concerns its place in legal 
policy discussions. After all, Easterbrook and Fischel occupied the same 
methodological space. 
This hybrid status does leave the TPM unattached on the wider 
academic landscape. Shareholder advocates see themselves as Jensen 
and Meckling’s successors and enjoy the convenience of reference to the 
copious theoretical and empirical literature on agency costs produced 
by financial economists. The TPM, while derived from high theory, does 
not enjoy such a cross-disciplinary source of support. Over in financial 
economics, inquiry into incompleteness problems tends toward either 
moral hazard or information-based explanations; there is no 
comparable interest in teams. Not that support is utterly lacking. The 
TPM enjoys an indirect line of confirmation from an information-based 
model of management myopia (and an accompanying empirical 
literature) that descends from theoretical work by Jeremy Stein.125 
There is a notable confluence at both bottom lines: shareholder pressure 
chokes firm-specific investment under both the TPM and the myopia 
model. 
B. The TPM as Contractarianism 
Blair and Stout assert that the TPM is contractarian, but do not 
elaborate. The assertion jars on the first encounter. Contractarianism 
comes from Easterbrook and Fischel, a team famous not only for 
 
 124. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 115, at 691–96; see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, 
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248–
50 (2017) (contending that, given externalities, firms should maximize shareholder welfare net of 
externalities rather than market value). 
 125. See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–
67 (1988) (showing formally that, even absent agency costs, managers of the firm threatened by a 
takeover will sell an underpriced asset); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient 
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) (modeling 
suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock prices 
and long-run value).  
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introducing agency theory to corporate law126 but for privileging 
efficiency over fairness, asserting that parties to corporate contracts 
want whatever maximizes value regardless of any allocative 
inequalities.127 Blair and Stout reject the agency picture and make the 
internal solution of allocative problems the touchstone of their 
descriptive model. The contrast is stark. 
But the TPM is indeed contractarian, much more so than is the 
shareholder paradigm. Easterbrook and Fischel seek to merge 
corporate law into a microeconomic agency account as fully as possible. 
In so doing, their model validates the corporate law inheritance,128 
accepting self-interested behavior on management’s part (and resultant 
agency costs) as an inevitable concomitant of the system.129 Blair and 
Stout pursue the same program. The shareholder paradigm, in 
contrast, seeks affirmatively to reduce agency costs to zero in the teeth 
of Jensen and Meckling.130  
The TPM, like Easterbrook and Fischel’s model, presupposes 
evolution over time in a productive direction both for actual contracts 
and for competitively derived provisions of corporate law. Blair and 
Stout reject the account of charter competition as corruption,131 an 
account favored by some shareholder paradigm proponents.132  
Blair and Stout also abjure any concern with fairness. Even as 
they worry about allocational disputes, they insist only that each team 
member get a return in excess of their reservation price. Any further 
distributive considerations are remitted to board of directors to be dealt 
with in the context of the firm’s ongoing internal politics. The TPM’s 
zone of discretion at this point accomplishes something that proves 
difficult to do from an agency perspective—it leaves open an 
opportunity for the mediating hierarch to take ethical concerns into 
account on behalf of team members who contribute human capital. 
Given an agency perspective, any financial sacrifices resulting from 
 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
 127. The most famous exemplar of this thinking is their paper on corporate control. Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1417–18 (“Although managers are 
self-interested, this interest can be aligned with that of investors through automatic devices, 
devices that are useless when those in control are ‘disinterested’ . . . .”). 
 130. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 115, at 688. 
 131. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
 132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1992). 
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ethical restraint give rise to a debilitating “other peoples’ money” 
problem.133  
There are even strong parallels between Easterbrook and 
Fischel and Blair and Stout regarding the statement of corporate 
purpose. A good contractarian leaves the purpose of the firm over to the 
contracting participants, keeping contractarian theory free of any 
mandatory taint. Easterbrook and Fischel certainly play it this way, 
going so far as to say “who cares?” about purpose.134 But in the end they 
stumble onto the shareholder primacy party line. When the parties say 
nothing about purpose a term must be implied to serve as a background 
default: 
For most firms the expectation is that the residual riskbearers have contracted for a 
promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of 
their stock. Other participants contract for fixed payouts—monthly interest, salaries, 
pensions, severance payments, and the like. This allocation of rights among the holders 
of fixed and variable claims serves an economic function. Riskbearers get a residual claim 
to profit; those who do not bear risk on the margin get fixed terms of trade.135 
This “promise to maximize long-run profits” is an odd promise 
for a director or manager to make, and not because it puts the 
shareholders first. The dissonance follows from the term “maximize.” 
Who would ever promise to do that? How, in a complicated world, could 
performance or breach be verified? An economist working in 
shareholder primacy mode can construct a partial equilibrium model of 
a problem that gets us from a stated here to an efficient, maximizing 
there. That is the economist’s job, but it can be performed successfully 
only under highly controlled conditions.136 No such maximization 
templates obtain in the real world of going concerns, where no one really 
knows when wealth is being maximized. Moreover, even if someone 
derived a plausible maximizing template for a given producing context, 
corporate law would make no attempt to impose it, so powerful (and 
practical) is the business judgment inheritance. To interpolate a 
promise to maximize in the real world is to allow the economics to 
dominate the law in the fused description in a way that makes no sense. 
The best that corporate law can do is to facilitate the corporation’s 
attempt to maximize the value it produces. The contractual equivalent 
is the standard “best efforts” formulation.   
 
 133. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—the Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-
friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/8SMM-56JL]. 
 134. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 38, at 1446. 
 135. Id. at 1446–47. 
 136. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 696–98. 
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Blair and Stout, as proper contractarians, are sparing in their 
use of maximization terms. “Maximize” and “maximization” show up 
only twenty-one times in A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law 
(usually in connection with the citation or description of the work of 
others); “efficient” and “efficiency” similarly appear only twenty-one 
times; and “optimal” is used a bare eleven times. This reticence works 
in tandem with the model’s second-best aspirations—efficient results 
are not to be expected. Furthermore, the mediating hierarchs 
themselves, the members of the board, do not even occupy the second-
best space. They are trustees looking for modest returns in their 
personal accounts, acquitting themselves of a duty. Given that, a 
promise to maximize is doubly improbable. Meanwhile, the directors’ 
duty makes its first appearance in the TPM phrased defensively—the 
board’s job is to protect the team members’ firm-specific investments.137 
This is a sensible formulation. Unfortunately, Blair and Stout keep 
going only to stumble upon a maximization directive in the end: the 
mediating hierarch’s “primary function is to exercise [its] control in a 
fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the team as a whole.”138 As 
we have seen, they are in distinguished company as they stumble. Like 
Easterbrook and Fischel, they interpolate a maximand as an implied, 
default term, drawing on their economic model for inspiration. It is a 
momentary and forgivable lapse in both cases.   
It also bears noting that Blair and Stout’s fusion of the legal 
model and the economic description carries the contractarian project a 
step farther along, for they accept the legal inheritance in all 
particulars. Easterbrook and Fischel, in contrast, found that the 
contractarian presumption favoring the inherited legal dispensation 
could be overcome as regards hostile takeovers, as to which they made 
a prominent law reform suggestion—a ban on defensive responses.139 
The suggestion is in turn unsurprising—the hostile takeover is the 
linchpin of Easterbrook and Fischel’s system of market controls.140 
Blair and Stout, as we have seen, boldly accept corporate law’s 
permissive envelopes for takeover defense and reinvestment of free cash 
 
 137. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 253. 
 138. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
 139. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981) (“[S]hareholders’ welfare is 
maximized by an externally imposed legal rule severely limiting the ability of managers to resist 
a tender offer even if the purpose of resistance is to trigger a bidding contest.”). 
 140. At this critical point Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism overlaps the shareholder 
paradigm—their reform suggestion presages the shareholder paradigm’s later agency cost 
reductive law reform program. 
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flow.141 The comparison is telling—where Easterbrook and Fischel are 
forced to gloss over a big sticking point, the TPM’s fusion works neatly.  
C. The TPM as Corporate Law 
As we have seen, the TPM has doctrinal sticking points of its 
own, however impressive the overall neatness of fit. And they cannot be 
analyzed and distinguished away. The problem lies in the doctrine’s 
equivocation regarding the legal statement of corporate purpose and 
the shareholders’ place in it. Delaware, going back at least to the 
watershed 1984 case of Aronson v. Lewis, holds that the board owes its 
fiduciary obligations “to the corporation and its shareholders.”142 The 
formulation leaves in place the doctrinal superstructure described by 
Blair and Stout; it does not declare an agency. But it also appears to 
bring in the shareholders as contingent fiduciary beneficiaries, opening 
a door to a fiduciary breach triggered by a defensive or other allocative 
action injurious to the shareholder interest. 
Blair and Stout address and dismiss this quirk in the doctrine 
in their treatment of the famous 1919 case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.143 
Henry Ford, the closely held motor company’s controlling shareholder, 
was withholding dividend payments. An enormous cash hoard had 
accumulated. The Dodge brothers, minority shareholders and 
competitors, claimed a breach of fiduciary duty. Ford posed an 
innovative managerialist defense—the business plan should pass 
 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99. 
 142. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). Significantly, the statement in the 
opinion footnotes to a string cite of law review articles that includes a range of positions. The 
court’s comment is open-ended: “The broad question of structuring the modern corporation in order 
to satisfy the twin objectives of managerial freedom of action and responsibility to shareholders 
has been extensively debated by commentators.” Id. at 811 n.4; accord N. Am. Cath. Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that 
the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“In discharging [the board’s 
function to manage the corporation], the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the 
corporation and its shareholders.”); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing 
their duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation 
and its shareholders.”); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“This 
formulation captures the foundational relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation 
for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual claimants. Nevertheless, ‘stockholders’ best interest 
must always, within legal limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be considered only 
instrumentally to advance that end.’ ”).  
 There is a similar equivocation in the best-known legal statement of the purpose of the 
corporation (as opposed to the purpose of corporate law), the statement contained in section 2.01(a) 
of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: “a corporation [ ] should have 
as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.” 1 AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994).  
 143. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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inspection because it benefitted employees and consumers. He lost: “[a] 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders,” said the Michigan Supreme Court.144 Blair and 
Stout are unconcerned, telling us that Dodge v. Ford is a close 
corporation case and viewed as such should not be read as a bold 
traversal of the public corporation’s business judgment envelope; it 
should instead be seen as an uncontroversial intervention against a 
majority shareholder effecting an unequal allocation.145 Close 
corporations, in any event, lie outside of the TPM’s clearly stated 
bounds.  
Delaware recently replayed Dodge in eBay Domestic Holdings, 
Inc. v. Newmark.146 There, the majority interest in a close corporation, 
Craigslist, Inc., invoked community welfare to justify defensive 
measures against a minority shareholder interested in monetization. 
They were slapped down in Chancery: “Having chosen a for-profit 
corporate form, the [C]raigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary 
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of 
its stockholders.”147 Significantly, Blair and Stout would pose exactly 
the same distinction—Craigslist being a close corporation—with 
explicit support from language in the eBay opinion.148 Delaware courts 
otherwise wax eloquent about maximizing for the common stock only in 
cases involving common-preferred stock conflicts.149 Just as Blair and 
Stout predict, they avoid committing themselves to shareholder 
primacy in respect of public corporations150 lacking a controlling 
shareholder.151  
 
 144. Id. at 684. 
 145. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 301–02. 
 146. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 147. Id. at 34. 
 148. Id. at 28–31 (stressing that the case law on poison pills concerns publicly traded 
companies, not close corporations). 
 149. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he 
standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive in good faith and on an informed basis 
to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its contractual claimants.”). 
 150. Even the Revlon rule, originally framed in terms of maximization, came in for relaxation. 
See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he basic teaching of 
[Revlon and its related] precedents is simply that the directors must act in accordance with their 
fundamental duties of care and loyalty.”). 
 151. Given a controlling shareholder, the Delaware courts do exalt the status of the 
shareholders—minority shareholders—particularly in merger cases. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) and its many progeny. These situations are not within the zone 
covered by the TPM. A question arises as to whether the line-drawing that leads to the exclusion 
is unduly expedient. These can be large enterprises reliant on their teams, suggesting that the 
exclusion is ill-constructed. At the same time, the disputes covered lie within the shareholder 
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A question nonetheless arises about the state of the law: Could 
Dodge v. Ford happen today in respect of a publicly traded company 
under separated ownership and control? I answer yes: if the case came 
up again in Delaware with the same arguments on the table it would 
come out the same way. A business run for the benefit of employees 
would be held to traverse the rights of the shareholders in the 
“corporation and its shareholders.” The answer does not much 
destabilize the TPM, however, for Dodge would never come up with the 
same arguments on the table. The defending board would obscure its 
managerialist objectives in the language of long-term corporate profit 
and shareholder value enhancement. So long as the defending 
managers grounded their case in a justificatory record (a task easily 
accomplished) and were not otherwise self-dealing, their allocational 
acts would be covered by the cloak of business judgment. The TPM’s 
envelope of discretion would persist. 
A caveat must be entered nonetheless. Management is 
privileged to wear the business judgment cloak only if it remains ready 
to pay lip service to the shareholder interest. Commitment to the 
shareholder interest must never be explicitly denied, whatever the 
occulted truth. Management must genuflect when challenged. And it 
routinely does so, knowing that the ritual has performative value. It is 
in management’s interest to hew to the norm, for it emerges from the 
act of worship at the shareholder altar with its own power and position 
legitimated. Thus did the Business Roundtable bow to the shareholders 
in its first Statement on Corporate Governance, issued in 1997.152  
Meanwhile, legal ambiguity prevails—a constructive ambiguity. 
In the century since Dodge, the issue has never been joined in respect 
of investment and earnings retention policy at a public company. No 
manager wants a challenge and, remarkably, no shareholder plaintiff 
has ever pushed a manager into a corner on an allocative action, at least 
outside of the context of a sale of the company. Such is the genius of 
corporate law, a genius captured by the TPM. 
Let us nonetheless join the issue. Here is the hypothetical. A 
manufacturing firm employs skilled laborers, who contribute high value 
added as they produce a premium product. The company has a secure 
market share. Miraculously, a technician at the company invents a new 
mechanized process that can do most of the work done by the skilled 
 
precinct and do not directly concern providers of human capital. Moreover, given a controlled 
board, a mediating hierarch is absent as regards the complainants. It follows that Blair and Stout 
had no choice but to draw the line.  
 152. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1–4 (Sept. 1997) (“The 
Business Roundtable wishes to emphasize that the principal objective of a business enterprise is 
to generate economic returns to its owners.”). 
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laborers for a fraction of the cost. If the new process is deployed, the 
company will fire half of its workers, substantially lower its costs, and 
double its stock price even as revenues stay the same. Alternatively, the 
company can hold onto its market share and its revenue stream but 
retain the workers and suppress the new technology. Management, 
which believes that the existence of the technology can be kept secret, 
opts for suppression out of loyalty to its employees.  
The question is whether the suppressing board will be held to 
have breached its fiduciary duty when a disgruntled whistleblower 
discloses all to a plaintiff’s lawyer. I predict that it would be held so to 
do. The decision to suppress the technology would at a minimum be 
deemed antithetical to the company’s best interest and so in bad faith.  
The prediction cuts against Blair and Stout’s description of 
corporate law, but only a little. Note how careful one must be in crafting 
a hypothetical. If we resituate the case in a larger enterprise in which 
the particular product amounts to only ten percent of the business, I 
would have no trouble getting the decision back inside the business 
judgment tent—management could obscure the allocation as necessary 
for employee relations in the context of the company as a whole.  
Summing up, although corporate law does elevate the 
shareholders to primus inter pares status, it so equivocates as it does so 
that it leaves the TPM standing. 
D. The TPM as History 
We now ask how well the TPM synchronizes with corporate 
governance practice. It turns out that the tightness of fit varies 
depending on the moment in history.  
Blair and Stout state their contractarian fusion of law and 
economics ahistorically, as one would expect. But the model is 
nonetheless sensitive to historical contingency and has close ties to the 
posture of corporate governance at the time of its appearance. Indeed, 
the TPM could not credibly have appeared earlier than the late 1990s, 
even though its managerialist aspect recalls the post-war period. The 
managers of the 1950s and 1960s arguably were the greatest in history 
when it came to the advancement of non-shareholder team members’ 
welfare—those were the folks who invented employer-subsidized 
healthcare.153 But any attempt to situate the TPM in management’s 
golden age stalls quickly. The TPM depends absolutely on an 
 
 153. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The 
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 867–70 (2010). 
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independent, substantially disinterested monitoring board154 that 
stands in as a credible trustee to which team members can surrender 
their property rights with confidence. Such boards first appeared 
during the 1970s, and then only in theory.155 They gradually came to 
dominate in practice in the two succeeding decades. When the TPM 
appeared at the end of the 1990s, it had only recently become safe to 
assume that publicly traded companies had majority independent 
boards.156 Decades earlier, during management’s palmy days, the board 
was moribund and a model insisting on a central place for board 
independence would not have enjoyed descriptive credibility.   
The late 1990s suit the TPM in another respect. It was, 
relatively speaking, a quiet time. The takeover wars of the 1980s were 
over and the next century’s scandals and activist interventions were yet 
to come. Still, Blair and Stout had to look to backward and bring the 
takeover wars into the team picture. In TPM terms, the hostile 
takeovers of the 1980s amounted to a shareholder attack aimed at 
adjusting a prevailing team coalition settlement. Corporations emerged 
in the 1990s under a new, more shareholder-oriented settlement built 
on equity compensation plans that reoriented manager incentives 
toward stock price enhancement.157 Blair and Stout accept this and 
describe a mediating hierarch making a political adjustment to the 
waxing of institutional investor influence and the waning of trade union 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 155. For a picture of governance during the managerialist era, see Edward S. Mason, The 
Apologetics of “Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1, 1–5 (1958). During that period, monitoring gravitated 
over to the hands of government authorities, which mediated between producing companies and 
the markets. See Berle, supra note 16, at xxv. The shareholder franchise was likewise irrelevant, 
the annual vote for the board of directors having degenerated into a meaningless ritual. See ADOLF 
A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 104–05 (1959) (describing a stockholders’ vote as “apt to be a pale affair”). 
 156. Today it is safe to assume that they have super-majority independent boards. See William 
W. Bratton, Reconsidering the Evolutionary Erosion Account of Corporate Fiduciary Law 51 (Univ. 
of Pa. Carey L. Sch. Inst. For L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 21-04, 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753589 [https://perma.cc/UW8W-43YR] 
(“All of the Dow companies, all but one of the midcap companies, and all but four of the small cap 
companies reported super-majority independent boards.”). 
 157. The best description of this shift is Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 59, at 121–23. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan survey the evolution of shareholder-manager relations, noting that a 
regime of market-oriented corporate governance emerged in the wake of the 1980s. They depict 
the takeover wars as a reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as 
deregulation, globalization, and new information and communications technologies. The financial 
markets, they observed, showed a comparative advantage over management in undertaking the 
structural adjustments made necessary by the changes. The shift to market control, viewed from 
this perspective, followed neither from its intrinsic superiority respecting capital allocation nor 
from a structurally embedded level of excess agency costs, but from transitory economic factors. 
For Holmstrom and Kaplan, takeovers were a one-time-only external shock that did not imply a 
permanent shift of the locus of production decisionmaking from within the firm to outside markets. 
Id. at 137. 
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influence.158 Alternatively, they ascribe the change to international 
economic competition—the shareholders’ reservation price went up 
even as the labor market saw downward pressure on employee 
returns.159 Either way or both ways, power had shifted to the 
shareholders with the TPM description otherwise remaining intact.  
Now let us turn our attention to another 1980s phenomenon, the 
management buyout, which interplays interestingly with the TPM’s 
definitional limitation to publicly traded companies under separated 
ownership and control. To go private is to exit the TPM: because the 
buyout implicates control transfer to a blockholder and delisting, the 
buyout target no longer has separated ownership and control. 
Management buyouts resembled hostile takeovers in reflecting the shift 
in public shareholders’ favor, for they too cashed public shareholders 
out at a premium. The difference was that the incumbent management 
group worked cooperatively with a financial intermediary in a friendly 
transaction (even as it laid itself open to the disciplinary ministrations 
of a control party post-closing). The objective was leveraged 
restructuring and an enhanced return on equity, and, as was the case 
with many hostile offers, the transaction led to brutal cost-cutting and 
reductions in workforce. Buyout deals turned on defection against 
inside team members by management incumbents looking for jackpot 
personal payoffs. This is not the way of the TPM. Blair and Stout’s 
definitional line drawing finesses the problem. To go private, they 
explain, is to determine that agency problems so dominate as to justify 
a shift away from the team coalition to a shareholder-controlled 
board.160 The point is fair one and the line of demarcation holds. 
But there is a residual element of disquiet. Management buyouts 
are about leveraged speculation and defection against the team as well 
as agency cost reduction.161 The target eviscerates its team even as it 
stays in the product market with its profile unchanged, suggesting that 
team cohesion may not be as essential as the TPM asserts. As the flow 
of companies from public to private by buyout increases, the real-world 
productivity advantages of team governance diminish. Happily, by the 
time the TPM appeared in the late 1990s, the leveraged restructuring 
moment seemed to have passed. Neither leveraged hostile takeovers 
nor leveraged management buyouts were occurring in significant 
numbers.162  
 
 158. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 325–26. 
 159. Id. at 326. 
 160. Id. at 322. 
 161. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 517–18 (8th ed. 
2016). 
 162. Id. at 513, 1116–17. 
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There was also notable movement from private to public on the 
startup front during the late 1990s, a movement tending to confirm the 
TPM’s robustness.163 Venture capital (“VC”) startups manage to achieve 
teamwork in the absence of the TPM’s independent, mediating board. 
VC deal structures tend to split the board between a founder and the 
founder’s designees and designees of the venture capitalist who holds 
convertible preferred stock.164 To be sure, many structures include a 
link to the logic of the TPM: where the VC and the founder are allocated 
equal numbers of board seats, there is also a nominally independent tie-
breaker director.165 Overall, however, VC startup governance is 
characterized by a principal-agent structure channeled through 
elaborate negotiated mechanisms that allocate not only control but 
return on investment. Such a setup lies outside the TPM’s well-defined 
limits. But, at the time the TPM appeared in the late 1990s, there were 
no negative implications. Startup success meant an IPO and eventual 
transition to separated ownership and control.166 For all that appeared, 
a shift to team governance was an inevitable concomitant of 
organizational maturity.  
Thus was 1999 the perfect moment for the TPM. Independence 
finally prevailed in boardrooms. There was little hostility (and hostile 
takeovers never did come back). There was little movement from public 
to private. An unprecedented spate of VC IPOs magnified the team 
model’s salience. Even as incentive structures had evolved to adjust the 
scales in the shareholders’ favor at public companies, separated 
ownership and control and team production, thus adjusted, still 
prevailed as the governance mode for large enterprise.  
E. The TPM in History 
Developments in corporate governance since the turn of this 
century have not gone the TPM’s way, at least at first glance. The power 
shift in the shareholders’ direction has intensified markedly, so much 
so that the problem of separated ownership and control has been 
 
 163. For further discussion of the TPM’s interplay with venture capital governance, see 
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 177–78 (2019). 
 164. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: 
An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–90 (2003). 
 165. Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 461, 468–71 (2010). 
 166. See Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV., 
https://hbr.org/2017/11/when-founders-go-too-far (last visited Sept. 25, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/MEX9-DKJ2]. 
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pronounced solved.167 At the same time (and perhaps ironically), fewer 
companies operate under separated ownership and control,168 partly 
due to a renewed trend toward privatization and partly due to 
continuing concentration through mergers. It seems that team integrity 
matters less and less, detracting from the TPM’s economic and policy 
salience. But let us take a closer look. 
The continued shift of power to shareholders by no means 
negates the TPM. The shift follows in the first instance from activist 
hedge fund interventions in business planning. These engagements do 
cut against the case made in A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law—the activists so invigorate the shareholder franchise as to 
superannuate the TPMs characterization of shareholder voting.169 But 
they do not somehow turn the hedge funds into juridical principals. The 
successful activist usually leaves the independent mediating board in 
place, working with the existing team and the received legal model.170 
The activists use the franchise to lever their way to a place at the 
business planning table171 and then use board representatives for 
ongoing monitoring. The difference is that the mediators are now much 
more likely to favor items on shareholder agendas. The items—asset 
sales, cost cutting, share buybacks, and sell-side mergers—look to 
monetize investments in the firm and channel the proceeds into 
shareholder pockets, thereby making the environment less protective of 
firm-specific investment. The follow-on question, in the view of many, 
is whether the pendulum has shifted so far in the direction of short-
term monetization and away from productive long-term investment.172 
Thus in 2019 did the Business Roundtable, taking advantage growing 
skepticism regarding shareholder primacy, withdraw its 1997 
 
 167. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865, 867, 874 (2013). 
 168. See Margaret M. Blair, Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, 105 CORNELL 
L. REV. 641, 653–73 (2020) (highlighting the “decline in the number of IPOs and in the number of 
publicly traded corporations since 2000”).  
 169. See supra text accompanying note 105–106. 
 170. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1405–09 
(2007). 
 171. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 692–94. 
 172. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT 37 (2020) (prepared for the Eur. Comm’n): 
[T]he prominence of shareholder primacy in corporate governance and the pressure it 
generates to pursue short-term profit maximisation leads board members not to take 
sufficient account of the long-term interests of stakeholders other than shareholders (such 
as employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the society at large as well as the 
environment); 
COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE 
TRUST IN IT (2013) (arguing for binding statements of commitment to broad welfare enhancement). 
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endorsement.173 As the question about perverse effects looms larger, the 
TPM’s policy salience undergoes restoration. 
The trend toward privatization does not negate the TPM either, 
even as it certainly does entail movement away from independent 
boards and their teams in favor of institutional shareholder control. 
Management buyouts for all intents and purposes had disappeared 
when the TPM appeared in the late 1990s. Thereafter, in the wake of 
the market correction of 2000–2002, they returned to the frontline of 
the mergers and acquisitions market (rebranded as private equity) and 
have held their place ever since.174 Very few private equity targets 
return to public trading as stand-alone companies, although many do 
return to separated ownership and control after being sold to public 
corporations in strategic mergers.175 At the same time, many targets 
stay private indefinitely.176  
Prior to 2020, we also experienced a periodic decline in the 
number of IPOs of venture capital-backed startups. This resulted from 
an expanded base of private capital, a willingness to delay the 
incurrence of regulatory costs,177 increased numbers of private sales,178 
and perhaps the economics of options (delay preserves option value). 
But the question went less to the ultimate advantages of a public listing 
than to the costs and benefits determining the length of delay. Here too, 
then, the TPM still stands, albeit with a reduced zone of operation. 
The TPM, in sum, still fits corporate governance practice, 
although not nearly as neatly as it did twenty years ago. How then does 
the TPM look today when compared to its rivals in corporate legal 
theory—Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism and the 
shareholder paradigm? Proponents of both theories doubtless will have 
found much to celebrate as the shareholders have racked up real-world 
victories. But as between the two rival theories, only the contractarian 
model comes away looking more robust in light of recent events. Indeed, 
 
 173. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/GM9N-G5F8] (“While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate 
purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”); see also Letter from 
Larry Fink, CEO, BlackRock, Inc., to client CEOs (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/GJV2-4UEY] (“Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, 
serve a social purpose.”). 
 174. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS, 542–551 (9th ed. 
2021). 
 175. BRATTON, supra note 161, at 520–21. 
 176. The private equity firms sell them to one another in so-called secondary buyouts. Id.  
 177. Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 171–74 
(2017). 
 178. Blank, supra note 166, at 99. 
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corporate governance now finally begins to look the way Easterbook and 
Fischel said it looked three decades ago. Shareholder empowerment for 
the most part follows from ground level changes in markets and 
financial institutions—changes that reduce agency costs—much as the 
contractarian model predicts.179 Its accomplishment validates ex post a 
description that fell short of accuracy at the time it appeared. The 
shareholder paradigm, in contrast, is falsified by recent developments 
in practice. It counsels that embedded institutional arrangements 
prevent shareholder empowerment and foster permanently excessive 
agency costs, necessitating law reform. As it has turned out, there was 
nothing embedded about shareholder disempowerment. No reform has 
been necessary.  
Corporate legal theory now enters a phase well-suited to a 
contractarian perspective. It has two contractarian models on which to 
draw, one based on agency and the other the TPM. They are best viewed 
as complementary to one another. 
 CONCLUSION 
Blair and Stout intervened in the midst of corporate legal 
theory’s long, agency-centric run to show that the set of available 
microeconomic referents was larger and more descriptively rich than 
could be yielded by a framework strictly focused on agency cost 
reduction. They put forward a cogent counter-story that focused on 
management’s role in marshalling factors of production rather than 
management’s relationship with public equity holders. They parried 
every thrust made in the patchwork of theories surrounding 
shareholder primacy and successfully contended that their description 
better accounted for the terms of corporate law. They also redirected 
corporate law and economics from a collection of extensions of the 
Jensen and Meckling model to the basic teaching of the first theorem of 
welfare economics.  
And they were right about a lot of things. But even as they 
earned a place at the table, they did not upset the agency-centric apple 
cart because they sought to legitimize management power where most 
others saw an embedded accountability problem. This disposition 
bespeaks the view that agency costs outweigh in magnitude the costs of 
team disruption, a view less driven by conclusive empirical findings 
than by normative priors. Corporate law scholarship, like all legal 
scholarship, is at bottom normative. Within its normative frame of 
 
 179. Legal reform has played a strictly secondary role. Bratton & Sepe, supra note 118, at 724, 
n.177. 
Bratton Team Production Revisted 0929 (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2021 10:09 AM 
142 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:nnn 
reference, nothing more consistently excites academic engagement than 
the sight of power without accountability. The turn to empirical inquiry 
and interdisciplinary reference to theories from social science does not 
change this normative orientation, even as it certainly does mean an 
increase in the volume of descriptive scholarship.  
At the same time, new directions in corporate law scholarship 
are driven by developments in practice and the arrival of the hedge fund 
activists has been a paradigm-shifting practical development. The 
separation of ownership and control is no longer corporate law’s great 
unsolved problem. The new question is whether we have entered a new 
era of power without accountability, this time on the shareholder side. 
Given an affirmative answer, the TPM matters more than ever.  
Where, then, are we going? The management moral hazard 
problem has not gone away, even as the growing influence of 
shareholders fosters just the sorts of perverse effects highlighted by the 
TPM. The theoretical question posed is not an either/or—do we stick 
with an exclusive focus on management moral hazard or go with team 
production (or management myopia or whatever you prefer to call it)? 
We inevitably will be doing both—it will be markets and 
hierarchies180—and we do not have a theory that tells us in a nice, neat 
box how to do both at once. We accordingly find ourselves weighing a 
growing list of costs and benefits. This is an uncomfortable place to be 
for a field that is only really comfortable following a clear-cut normative 
vector. Round and round we’ll go between shareholder value and stable 
production environments and concern about externalities and where we 
stop is anybody’s guess. One thing can be predicted safely: 
developments in practice will determine the stop point, as they always 
have in the past. 
I will add a tentative, contractarian projection. Suppose that 
private ordering continues to work well and advances to a higher level: 
We evolve past today’s one-size-fits-all governance model to a new level 
at which (1) all parties in interest take a company-specific view of items 
on activist agendas, scrupulously weighing short-term results against 
long-term opportunities, and, (2) boards of directors, activists, and other 
institutional shareholders learn how to contract with each other to 
 
 180. Cf. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 294–97 (1985) (recognizing the firm entity as a hierarchical governance 
structure significantly distinguishable from market contracting and focusing on bounded 
rationality and opportunistic conduct as limitations on market contracting). Oliver Williamson 
later posited an intermediate category. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as 
Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 171, 180–81 (2002). 
Williamson’s category does not, however, describe today’s shareholder-directed public 
corporations.eci 
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determine suitable, company-specific power allocations.181 It could 
follow that the power without accountability problem would again fade 
to the rear and that corporate governance would drop back from the 
policy margin to become a quieter, more technical precinct. The 
projected environment would occupy a place much like that presently 
occupied by corporate decisionmaking concerning capital structure—a 
place where business judgment and arm’s length contracting operate 




 181. Cf. ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND 
PROFIT 38–57 (2020) (arguing that while growing the pie and attending constituent concerns is 
inconsistent with shareholder primacy it does often maximize profits in the long run). 
